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Maoists Challenge of Chhattisgarh

Posted on April 7, 2021 by admin1  1360

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Recently, there have been incidents of security personnel getting killed and injured in encounters with Maoists in Sukma district of Chhattisgarh.

Recent Sukma Incident

  • A joint team of the Chhattisgarh Police comprising the District Reserve Guard (DRG) and the Special Task Force (STF), along with various teams of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), proceeded for an operation in south Bastar, a region with Maoist strongholds.
  • They were attacked by a People’s Liberation Guerilla Army (PLGA) platoon in the Tarrem area near the Sukma-Bijapur border.
  • Earlier Incidents
    • Since the 2010 Chintalnar massacre, the Dantewada-Sukma-Bijapur axis has claimed hundreds of lives of security force personnel and several civilians.

                                                                                      (Image Courtesy: The Hindu)

 Chhattisgarh: A Maoist Bastion

  • The detection and eradication of Maoist movement in neighbouring Andhra Pradesh and Odisha in early 2000s has led to a concentration of cadre and leaders in the Bastar region.
  • During the same time, the Maoist movement went through a transformation of being a struggle against a class enemy (landlords) to a tribal movement against the state.
  • Between 2018 and 2020, Chhattisgarh has accounted for 45% of all incidents in the country and 70% of security personnel deaths in such incidents.

 

 

Attack Patterns

  • Most attacks and casualties happen between March and July.
  • This is because the Communist Party of India (Maoist) usually launches its tactical counter-offensive campaign between February and the end of June.
  • It involves aggressive military operations against security forces before the monsoons hit the region, which makes the movement difficult.
  • Reasons for Stronghold
    • The state’s case is different and more complex also because Maoists had made strongholds in areas that had not even been mapped, let alone be administered.
    • Over the years, Maoists have managed to entrench themselves in remote and inaccessible tribal pockets and the withdrawal of state institutions of governance in such areas have resulted in a security and development vacuum. This suited the Maoists, who have set up some form of rudimentary parallel system of administration in these areas.
    • Chhattisgarh is easier to operate in terrain-wise, than other states. Also, the Bastar region provides easy movement for the rebels across borders because of its proximity to other states.
    • Operations in Chhattisgarh tend to be more complicated as the contingent of security forces tend to be larger than other states.
    • Also, the public has more sympathy for the Maoists in the state.
    • Security forces are still struggling in this region and the state police have been reluctant to take the lead in the fight.
    • Factors for Slow Progress Against Maoists: Remote jungle terrain, lack of political will, absence of roads, communication and proper administration.
  • Countering Measures
    • Crackdown on Maoists in Left Wing Extremism (LWE) states started mainly in 2005.
      • The number of districts declared Naxal-affected is now just 90, down from over 200 in the early 2000s. Yet, Chhattisgarh struggles.
    • In the state, the Salwa-Judum militia campaign was launched which proved to be counterproductive.
    • The DRG, a special counter-Maoist force, was raised and trained by the CRPF to take lead with support from CRPF, however, CRPF continues to be the spearhead till date in Chhattisgarh.
      • DRG has tribal recruits from Bastar and employs surrendered Maoists too, which gives it the advantages of local knowledge and intelligence gathering.
      • However, it is relatively new and lacks combat capabilities of the Greyhounds (Andhra Pradesh).
    • The elite Commando Battalion for Resolute Action (CoBRA) of the CRPF, a unit specially trained for operations in areas affected by LWE.
    • Involvement and modernisation of state police forces. Successful examples,
      • Andhra Pradesh: Greyhounds.
      • Maharashtra: Local police and the C60 force.
      • West Bengal: Ingenious strategy adopted by the state police.
      • Jharkhand: Jharkhand Jaguars.
      • Odisha: Broad administrative interventions in Koraput.
  • Suggestions
    • The political will of the state is of paramount importance. There should be policies and authorities to coordinate government schemes for development of these regions in a coherent manner.
      • In Andhra and Telangana, the government had created a Remote and Interior Area Development Authority.
    • Development of infrastructure including schools, hospitals and most importantly roads for connectivity along with job creations and marketing of forest products.
    • More frequent joint operations between central forces and local police to avoid confusion of command and coordination and casualties.
    • The Ministry of Home Affairs, in a document on LWE violence, has highlighted the importance of administration reaching remote areas.
    • The local police needs to take up the leadership position with the help of the central forces which have the numbers and the training to strengthen the joint operations.
    • Also, special forces should be provided with the freedom to operate otherwise no amount of training will help.

Naxalite-Maoist Insurgency in India

  • Naxalism draws its ideological inspiration from Marxism and Maoism.
  • The Maoist guerrillas seek to capture state power through a people’s war, and their military strategy is based on the teachings of Mao Zedong.
  • Andhra Pradesh witnessed the first seeds of the radical Marxist movement being sown just after India’s independence.
  • In 1967, the first armed uprising took place in the remote Naxalbari village in the Indian state of West Bengal. The uprising was suppressed soon after but it inspired other Maoist revolutionaries across India and also gave Naxalism its name.
  • It has been identified as the biggest threat to India’s internal security and the periodic Naxal violence is seen in India’s tribal belt, also called the “Red Corridor” spread across Chhattisgarh, Odisha, Jharkhand, Bihar, Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal.

                                                   (Image Courtesy: Aljazeera)

Factors Responsible for its Growth

  • Unavailability of Forest Resources: Many tribal people are not given their due in forest resources, along with the allocation of lands and resources to industries. The monopolization of the forest started with the enactment of various forest laws. It causes the loss of their livelihoods and creates frustration, encouraging them to become extremists.
  • Poor Policy Implementation: The government has not been able to stop the process of the tribal alienation and their displacement caused by large projects, along with the issue of food security. Rehabilitation procedures are also not upto the mark, thus creating marginalization of tribes.
  • Growing Regional Disparities: Naxalism attracts people with a poor livelihood and the failure of the government policies in curbing inter and intra regional disparities has led to people think that Naxalism can provide solutions to their problems.
  • Absence of Work Opportunities: Absence of proper industrialization has failed to generate employment for rural people leading to dissatisfaction with the government. It is also one of the causes behind Naxalism.
  • Lack of Land Reforms: The poor land reforms implementation has yielded negative results and the absence of proper implementation of survey and settlement has further damaged agricultural production and the rural economy.
  • Geographical Terrain: The thick forests in the region of the red corridor provide Naxalites a cover to hide and also in fighting against the police and the army by waging Guerrilla warfare.
  • Other Factors: The unequal development, poverty, unemployment, politicisation of their status, lack of education, awareness, connectivity to the major cities and infrastructure are other major influences on people joining the movement.
  • Regular Inflow of Finances: Maoists have been collecting finances from a variety of sources including big and small businesses, industries, contractors, government officials and political leaders. The largest and principal sources of income for the Maoists are the mining industry, PWD works and collection of tendu leaves.

Effects

  • Increased Militancy: Naxal cadres have attracted a lot of criticism for increased militancy and have been termed as the single biggest internal security threat for the country.
  • Unrest and Violence: Vested interests use the Naxal forces to go against the State and create more violence leading to an environment of unrest in the areas. The fights between Naxals and the forces lead to the death of police personnel, Naxals and other citizens irrespective of their engagement.
  • Under-Development: The constant clashes in the areas affected by Naxalism remain underdeveloped as it is not easy to form policies and implement them. The immediate economic and social problems of the masses take a back amidst the battle for supremacy with the state and the naxals.
  • Disruption to Democracy: Naxalites have always attempted to disrupt elections thereby not only preventing masses from choosing their leaders but also inhibiting them from exercising their fundamental right to vote.
  • Loss of State Property: There have been repeated incidents of Naxalites blowing up schools, trains and rail lines apart from government buildings which harm the common masses more than the politburo of governance.
  • Damage to Economy and Trade: Due to the stronghold of the naxals on the trade routes and also because of the extortion of money from various sources leave the trades and businesses with losses and hamper the economic flow of the states.

Government Measures to Control

  • Government provides incentives to encourage naxals to surrender and to return to the mainstream.
  • Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act (PESA), 1996 provided power to Gram Sabhas to take decisions on the use of the natural resources in their villages.
  • Regular conduct of meetings to the ministers and officials of the Naxal affected areas.
  • Various studies by the Tribal Advisory Council on the welfare of tribal people and suggestions.
  • The Union government, in association with the State government(s), monitors known routes and suspected persons to deal with the smuggling of arms and ammunition by the Naxals/Maoists.
  • Initiative to build a consensus among the affected states along with building up capacities of state police forces, among other things.
  • Operation SAMADHAN: It is the Ministry of Home Affairs’ answer to the Naxal problem and stands for Smart leadership, Aggressive strategy, Motivation and training, Actionable intelligence, Dashboard Based KPIs (key performance indicators) and KRAs (key result areas), Harnessing technology, Action plan for each theater, and No access to financing.
  • Joint Task Forces for operations along inter-State boundaries to be set up. Better inter-state coordination and intelligence sharing.
  • Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), 2002 to be reviewed to ensure effective choking of fund flow to LWE groups.

Further Suggestions

  • Infrastructure Improvement: Basic infrastructure and connectivity should be ensured in the under-developed areas leading to creation of livelihood opportunities.
  • Access to Forests: Government should provide tribals access to forest resources as their traditional knowledge on forest resources can help the economy as well.
  • Rehabilitation: Displaced people due to developmental projects need to be rehabilitated well and should be provided with sustainable livelihoods.
    • Dileep Singh Bhuria’s committee recommended that 50% of the ownership of developmental projects must be assigned to the local people.
  • Better Handling and Trust Gaining: Naxalism should not be seen as a mere internal security problem but should be treated as a societal, political and developmental issue and then the government should work more to earn the tribal people’s trust.
  • Improved Governance: Besides weakening and reducing Maoists operations, capacities and violence, it is crucial to ensure that governance is improved, development schemes and programmes are implemented effectively and monitored rigorously.
  • Measures to Curb Finances: Although a difficult process, it is necessary to clamp down on Maoist extortion/finances and restrict the flow of money.

Source: IE

 
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