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Recently, there have been incidents of security personnel getting killed and injured in encounters with Maoists in Sukma district of Chhattisgarh.
Recent Sukma Incident
- A joint team of the Chhattisgarh Police comprising the District Reserve Guard (DRG) and the Special Task Force (STF), along with various teams of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), proceeded for an operation in south Bastar, a region with Maoist strongholds.
- They were attacked by a People’s Liberation Guerilla Army (PLGA) platoon in the Tarrem area near the Sukma-Bijapur border.
- Earlier Incidents
- Since the 2010 Chintalnar massacre, the Dantewada-Sukma-Bijapur axis has claimed hundreds of lives of security force personnel and several civilians.
(Image Courtesy: The Hindu)
Chhattisgarh: A Maoist Bastion
- The detection and eradication of Maoist movement in neighbouring Andhra Pradesh and Odisha in early 2000s has led to a concentration of cadre and leaders in the Bastar region.
- During the same time, the Maoist movement went through a transformation of being a struggle against a class enemy (landlords) to a tribal movement against the state.
- Between 2018 and 2020, Chhattisgarh has accounted for 45% of all incidents in the country and 70% of security personnel deaths in such incidents.
Attack Patterns
- Most attacks and casualties happen between March and July.
- This is because the Communist Party of India (Maoist) usually launches its tactical counter-offensive campaign between February and the end of June.
- It involves aggressive military operations against security forces before the monsoons hit the region, which makes the movement difficult.
- Reasons for Stronghold
- The state’s case is different and more complex also because Maoists had made strongholds in areas that had not even been mapped, let alone be administered.
- Over the years, Maoists have managed to entrench themselves in remote and inaccessible tribal pockets and the withdrawal of state institutions of governance in such areas have resulted in a security and development vacuum. This suited the Maoists, who have set up some form of rudimentary parallel system of administration in these areas.
- Chhattisgarh is easier to operate in terrain-wise, than other states. Also, the Bastar region provides easy movement for the rebels across borders because of its proximity to other states.
- Operations in Chhattisgarh tend to be more complicated as the contingent of security forces tend to be larger than other states.
- Also, the public has more sympathy for the Maoists in the state.
- Security forces are still struggling in this region and the state police have been reluctant to take the lead in the fight.
- Factors for Slow Progress Against Maoists: Remote jungle terrain, lack of political will, absence of roads, communication and proper administration.
- Countering Measures
- Crackdown on Maoists in Left Wing Extremism (LWE) states started mainly in 2005.
- The number of districts declared Naxal-affected is now just 90, down from over 200 in the early 2000s. Yet, Chhattisgarh struggles.
- In the state, the Salwa-Judum militia campaign was launched which proved to be counterproductive.
- The DRG, a special counter-Maoist force, was raised and trained by the CRPF to take lead with support from CRPF, however, CRPF continues to be the spearhead till date in Chhattisgarh.
- DRG has tribal recruits from Bastar and employs surrendered Maoists too, which gives it the advantages of local knowledge and intelligence gathering.
- However, it is relatively new and lacks combat capabilities of the Greyhounds (Andhra Pradesh).
- The elite Commando Battalion for Resolute Action (CoBRA) of the CRPF, a unit specially trained for operations in areas affected by LWE.
- Involvement and modernisation of state police forces. Successful examples,
- Andhra Pradesh: Greyhounds.
- Maharashtra: Local police and the C60 force.
- West Bengal: Ingenious strategy adopted by the state police.
- Jharkhand: Jharkhand Jaguars.
- Odisha: Broad administrative interventions in Koraput.
- Crackdown on Maoists in Left Wing Extremism (LWE) states started mainly in 2005.
- Suggestions
- The political will of the state is of paramount importance. There should be policies and authorities to coordinate government schemes for development of these regions in a coherent manner.
- In Andhra and Telangana, the government had created a Remote and Interior Area Development Authority.
- Development of infrastructure including schools, hospitals and most importantly roads for connectivity along with job creations and marketing of forest products.
- More frequent joint operations between central forces and local police to avoid confusion of command and coordination and casualties.
- The Ministry of Home Affairs, in a document on LWE violence, has highlighted the importance of administration reaching remote areas.
- The local police needs to take up the leadership position with the help of the central forces which have the numbers and the training to strengthen the joint operations.
- Also, special forces should be provided with the freedom to operate otherwise no amount of training will help.
- The political will of the state is of paramount importance. There should be policies and authorities to coordinate government schemes for development of these regions in a coherent manner.
Naxalite-Maoist Insurgency in India
(Image Courtesy: Aljazeera) Factors Responsible for its Growth
Effects
Government Measures to Control
Further Suggestions
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Source: IE
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